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CALIFORNIA'S CIVIL APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
-AN INHERENT POWER OF THE COURTS
The nation's civil courts should be open to the poor. A person
who cannot afford the expenses normally incidental to litigation should
be provided with an alternative method of obtaining relief. This social
objective has long been recognized as worthwhile' and has stimulated
the development of procedural relief for the indigent.2 The various
procedures created in order to remove this economic barrier to the
courts have come to be categorized as "in forma pauperis"-literally
3
meaning "[i]n the character or manner of a pauper."
At present, the right of civil litigants to proceed in forma pauperis
has been given constitutional dimension only in limited areas. 4 Howl. See Barvick, Legal Services and the Rural Poor, 15 KAN. L. REv. 537 (1967);
Shriver, Law Reform and the Poor, 17 AM. U.L. Rnv. 1 (1967); Silverstein, Waiver
of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2
VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 21 (1967); Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political Perspective,
1968 Wis. L. REv. 694.
2. For a description of the historical recognition of the social objectives underlying the development of in forma pauperis rights and powers see Maguire, Poverty
and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1923). For a good treatment of the
early development in California see Note, Forma Pauperis Suits in California, 27
CALiF. L. REv. 352 (1939).
3. BLACK'S LAW DIcToNARY 895 (4th ed. 1951).
4. The Fourteenth Amendment has been utilized in one limited situationdivorce-to require an in forma pauperis procedure in a civil case. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie the court held that it was a denial of due
process to condition an indigent's access to the divorce courts on his ability to pay
the customary expenses. In so doing, the court authorized a waiver of normal filing
fees on behalf of the indigent litigant.
It was further suggested in Boddie that the imposition of general expenses, a
procedure which effectively closes the courts to indigents yet leaves them open to
wealthier litigants, violates equal protection provisions. Id. at 383-86 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, was the only member of the
court who suggested significant expansion; he felt that the equal protection clause
compelled relief to civil paupers on a broader scale. Id. at 386-89.
Arguably, both the due process and equal protection objections should be applica.
ble to contexts other than that of divorce. The court in Boddie refused to do so, however, and drafted a carefully limited opinion. Id. at 382-83. Because the Supreme
Court has taken this guarded approach, there is little hope that the appeal in forma
pauperis will be recognized as a constitutional right of civil indigents. Even in criminal cases one federal court has stated that the refusal to allow appeals in forma pauperis in a habeas corpus proceeding does not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 877 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
890 (1945). But see Mayer v. City of Chicago, 40 U.S.L.W. 4055 (U.S. Dec. 14,
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ever, the federal government and several states have enacted statutes
providing civil litigants with in forma pauperis relief.5 California
presently has no such statute, but the courts have allowed civil litigants in forma pauperis relief under a theory presupposing an inherent judicial power to grant such relief.' This inherent power in the
courts is traced to common law origins." The tribunals of pre-1850
England had exercised such a judicial power to enable poor persons to
sue in forma pauperis, 9 primarily because the early judges believed it
1971). In Dorsey, the Supreme Court denied certiorari but nevertheless granted the
indigent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-401 to -406 (1962);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-3 (1964); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 989(e) (1953); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 57.081 (1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3413 (1971); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 705-5 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 298 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 491305a to -1305b (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971); KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 602001 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. § 453.190 (1969); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 518185 (West Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 262, § 4 (1959); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 1574-76 (1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 514.040-.050 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 93-8625 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22A:1-7 (1969); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1110 to -112 (1969); OKLA.
1971-1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1604 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-1629 (Supp. 1970); Id. § 29-201 (1955); VA. CODE ANN.
LAW §§ 1101-02 (McKinney 1963);
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 151 (Supp.

§§ 14-1-183 to -185 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1971); W. VA. CODE §§ 50-6-5, 50-7-3,
59-1-36, 59-2-1 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 271.29 (Supp. 1971).
6. California at one time had a statutory provision for in forma pauperis litigation in justice courts.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 91 (Deerings 1931) (repealed,
Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 743, § 12, at 1810).
7. The California Supreme Court has not always accepted the theory that inherent power could be so exercised. Cf. Ex parte Harker, 49 Cal. 465, 467 (1875);
Webb v. Hanson, 2 Cal. 133, 134 (1852).
But cf. Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208
Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929), where the supreme court recognized a wide area for
the exercise of inherent powers: "Our courts are set up by the Constitution without
any special limitations; hence the courts have and should maintain vigorously all the
inherent and implied powers necessary to properly and effectively function as a separate department in the scheme of our state government." Id. at 442, 281 P. at 1020.
The use of inherent power to permit in forma pauperis procedures in California
was first established in Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
The power thus established continues to be exercised by the courts. Ferguson v. Keays,
4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971); Bank of America v. Superior
Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 575, 63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1967); County of Sutter v. Superior
Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966); Boyer v. County of Contra
Costa, 235 Cal. App. 2d 111, 45 Cal. Rptr. 58 (1965).
The courts in the state of Washington have adopted the lead of California in
Martin and have implemented in forma pauperis appeals under an inherent judicial
power. O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969).
8. See notes 24-26 infra.
9. Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254 (C.P. 1841); Bland v. Lamb, 37 Eng.
Rep. 680 (Ch. 1820); Fitton v. Macclesfield, 23 Eng. Rep. 459 (Ch. 1684); Anonymous, 86 Eng. Rep. 873 (C.P. 1677) (dictum) (in forma pauperis permissible at
trial only).
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necessary to provide the indigent some access to civil relief.
In the recent case of Ferguson v. Keays'0 the California Supreme
Court held that indigents could be exempted from the payment of
statutory appellate fees and based its holding on the court's inherent
common law power to grant such relief which had been previously established in England." The-supreme court in Ferguson explained that
the courts possessed this inherent power because California had adopted
as a matter of statute all the English common law, including the existing powers of the common law courts, except where such common law
procedures had been expressly overruled by statute. 2 The California
courts had previously exercised this inherent power to permit the waiver
of expenses for indigents at the trial level,' 3 and the court in Ferguson
concluded that the waiver of appellate filing fees by appellate courts
was a logical extension of this prior authority.' 4
This note will analyze the court's assertion of this common law
power in terms of a possible infringement by the judiciary upon the domain of the legislature, since a legislative enactment had established
the requirement for the payment of appellate filing fees.' 5 The precedent cited by the court to justify the exercise of inherent in forma
pauperis powers at the appellate level will be examined, and the extent
to which the court has established a workable procedure for determining and defining the existence and scope of other inherent common
law appellate powers will be discussed.
Martin v. Superior Court-The Exhumation
of an Inherent Power
The inherent power of California courts to allow proceedings in
forma pauperis for civil litigants was first recognized in the 1917 decision of Martin v. Superior Court.'6 The indigent plaintiff had re7
quested a jury trial, and under the California statute then applicable'
if a jury trial was demanded, the court was to charge the jury's per diem
and travel fees to the successful litigant in the lawsuit. To insure collection of these fees, advance deposits were normally required from
10. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971).
11. Id. at 654, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
12. Id. Much of the pre-1850 common law of England is adopted by CAL.
Cirv. CODE § 22.2 (West 1954). See note 26 infra.
13. E.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 297, 299, 168 P. 135, 138-39
(1917). See note 31 infra.
14. 4 Cal. 3d at 652, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
15. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 68926 (West Supp. 1971).
16. 176 Cal. 289, 168 P. 135 (1917).
17. Cal. Stat. 1871-1872, ch. 168, § 1, at 188, as amended, CAL. CODE Crv.
PRoc. § 196 (West Supp. 1971).
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both parties, with the losing side receiving a refund after judgment. 8
The successful party was, however, given the right to recover as costs
from the losing party the entire amount of such fees paid to the jury.' 9
The trial court in Martin determined that it did not have the power
to waive the advance deposit required under the statute, and the indigent plaintiff appealed to the California Supreme Court. The supreme court held that the trial judge had erred since California courts
had always possessed the inherent power to waive the advance deposit
2
required under the statute in any case involving an indigent . 1
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings;
however, the jury was subsequently dismissed on a procedural matter.'
This created a new problem for the plaintiff in Martin. In addition to
the statutory advance deposit requirement, another California statute required that when the jury had been dismissed, further court action
would be delayed until the party who had requested the jury paid certain designated fees. 22 Thus, on remand the provisions of this statute apparently barred the indigent plaintiff from obtaining relief.
This time, however, the trial judge exercised the court's inherent power
and waived the payment of the necessary fees.
The opposing party in the lawsuit, who was not himself an indigent, petitioned the California Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition claiming error on the part of the trial judge in his waiver of the
statutory requirement for the payment of the fees.23 The supreme
court, citing its prior holding in Martin, held that (1) the statutory
provision requiring the payment of fees did not specifically apply to indigents and (2) only a specific inclusion of indigents in the statute by
the legislature would remove from the trial judge his inherent power to
give in forma pauperis relief. 24 The court concluded that the inherent
18. Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 291, 168 P. 135, 136 (1917),
quoting a rule of the Superior Court of the County of Alameda, California. In addition each party was required to deposit, on a daily basis, one-half of the reporter's
fees. Id.
19. Cal. Stat. 1871-1872, ch. 168, § 1, at 188, as amended, CAL. CODE CrV.
PROC. § 196 (West Supp. 1971). This circuitous procedure was eliminated with the
enactment of Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 569, § 1, at 788.
20. 176 Cal. at 297, 299, 168 P. at 138-39.
21. The jury was dismissed in order to allow time for amendment of the pleadings. Majors v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. 270, 272, 184 P. 18, 19 (1919).
22. Cal. Stat. 1917, ch. 569, § 1, at 788, as amended, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 196 (West Supp. 1971).
23. 181 Cal. 270, 184 P. 18 (1919).
24. Id. at 273-76, 184 P. at 20-21. The court in Martin relied on the English
case of Brunt v. Wardle, 133 Eng. Rep. 1254, 1257 (C.P. 1841) for the proposition

that early English judges had exercised the common law power to allow indigents
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common law power of the courts to waive statutory fees had been un-

affected by the statutes.
Neither individually nor collectively are [such statutes] even susceptible of the construction that the design of the legislature was
to deny to the courts the exercise of their most just and most
necessary inherent power.2 5
By invoking this inherent judicial power derived from the courts
of the English common law,2 6 the California courts have waived sev7
eral types of statutory expenses since the time of MartinY.
In each

such instance, the court has invoked its inherent common law power
on the basis that the legislature did not specifically include indigents
within the coverage of the particular statute requiring the payment of
fees.2 8 Thus, the California courts have asserted that the inherent judicial common law power will be exercised to waive statutory fees for
indigents at the trial level whenever the state legislature has not disclosed a specific intent to preclude its use-either in the statutory language itself or in the legislative hearings involving proposed statutes
29
relating to court expenses.
to sue in forma pauperis. "inhere is still the controlling fact that the power of the
English common-law courts to remit fees on petition in forma pauperis did not have
its origin in any statute, but was in fact exercised as one of the inherent powers of
the courts themselves, quite independently of statute." 176 Cal. at 293-94, 168 P. at
137 (1917).
25. 181 Cal. at 273, 184 P. at 20.
26. "The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is
the rule of decision in all the courts of this State." CAL. Civ. CODE § 22.2 (West
1954), formerly CAL. POLMCAL CoDE § 4468 (in effect at the time of Martin).
This includes courts of equity as well as those of law. Martin v. Superior Court,
176 Cal. 289, 293, 168 P. 135, 137 (1917). Thus California appears to have accepted
the bulk of English common law as it stood in 1850, the year when the state constitution was adopted. People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 408, 32 P.2d 433,
435 (1934).
27. E.g., CAL. CODE Cirv. PRoc. § 978 (West 1955), was held waivable in
Roberts v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 241, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226, 230
(1968) ($100 deposit to cover costs waived).
28. E.g., County of Sutter v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1966), where the court waived the statutory requirement for the posting of
a cost bond in lawsuits against public entities on the basis of the plaintiffs indigency,
despite the fact that the language of the statutory provision did not exclude any section of the population from its coverage. The court explained: "Such statutes do not
trench upon the judicial power to permit litigation in forma pauperis. Although the
Legislature has power to modify or abrogate common law rules, a general statute
...
does not diminish judicial authority resting upon . . . common law doctrine."
Id. at 775, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
29. Id.; accord, Bank of America v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d 575,
63 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1967).
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Ferguson v. Keays-Waiver of Appellate Fees

In Ferguson the California Supreme Court consolidated three separate appeals from lower court rulings in civil cases.3
In each of
these three cases3 1 an asserted indigent had asked an appellate tribunal
to waive the fifty dollar appellate filing fee required by Government
Code section 68926. 3",
The supreme court deliberately chose not to consider possible
questions of equal protection or due process as the basis for its deci-

sion. 33 Instead, it acknowledged that California lacks any statutory
in forma pauperis relief provisions 34 and held that appellate judges,
like trial judges, possess
an inherent common law power to waive ap5
pellate filing fees.3
Utilizing the judicial approach to the waiver of fees at the trial
level which had been enunciated in Martin, the court reviewed the
language of the statute and the legislative history for any specific intent to include indigents within the coverage of the statute.3 6 The
court concluded that the legislature had not manifested the requisite
intent to specifically include indigents within its payment provisions.
None of these various provisions pertains to the subject of
the payment of filing fees by indigent persons; none expressly
37
denies to the appellate courts the power to waive those fees.
30. 4 Cal. 3d at 652, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399. This transfer was
accomplished under CAL. APP. CT. RULE 28(a).
31. In Ferguson the applicant sought to appeal a lower court's denial of a writ
of mandamus which stemmed from a petition to compel recognition of claimed exemptions from seizure under a writ of restitution. In Colon v. Superior Court, which
also involved a writ of mandamus, the applicant had asked the court of appeal to
instruct the trial court to order the county to pay the necessary fee for publishing
summons in her marital dissolution action. In the third case, Rowe v. Superior
Court, the applicant had sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to furnish a free transcript of proceedings relating to child support. 4 Cal. 3d at 652-53,
484 P.2d at 71-72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400.
32. "The fee for filing the record on appeal in a civil case appealed to a court of
appeal is fifty dollars ......
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 68926 (West Supp. 1971).
33.

"[W]e need not reach the question . . . of due process or equal protection

. 4 Cal. 3d at 656 n.6, 484 P.2d at 74 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.6.
34. Id. at 653, 484 P.2d at 72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
35. Id. at 652, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399. After this crucial determination, all three cases were transferred to an inferior court for further proceedings. Id. at 659, 484 P.2d at 76, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
36. Id. at 654-55, 484 P.2d at 73-74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02. The legislature
had recently increased the statutory appellate filing fee from $10 to $50. Cal. Stat.
1963, ch. 873, § 3, at 2121. Viewing the increase as a legislative attempt to counter
the effects of inflation so the fee could effectively continue to defray costs and
discourage unnecessary litigation, the court found no specific intent by this raise to
specifically include indigents. 4 Cal. 3d at 658, 484 P.2d at 76, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
37. 4 Cal. 3d at 656, 484 P.2d at 74, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 402. The court spe-
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The court was careful, however, to recognize the legitimate purposes of the filing fees and to consider the impact of waving those
fees. The court first explained that the requirement for the payment
of appellate fees served both to provide "financial support for our
courts and [to discourage] frivolous or unnecessary litigation."'3
A
waiver of such fees would, of course, reduce the revenue available for
the financial support of the courts; however, the court found such a reduction to be a necessary sacrifice on behalf of indigent appellants.
The court formulated safeguards to preclude sham or frivolous appeals
by indigents whose appellate filing fees were waived-safeguards such
as certificates of merit and summary dismissal 39-and concluded that
these safeguards were adequate to preserve the legislative purpose in
requiring payment of fees.4"
The Precedent for Ferguson
The position of the Ferguson court that the court had the inherent
common law power to waive the statutory fees because appeals in forma
pauperis existed in English common law appears to be based on ample authority. Although there was dispute over this point in a few
early English cases,4 1 the availability of the appeal in forma pauperis
seems to have become an established doctrine in the English common
law courts by 1850.42 However, the Ferguson decision, though in accord with this heritage of English law, does seem to conflict with language in an early appellate case in California, Rucker v. Superior
Court.43 Rucker involved a suit to quiet title in which the indigent
petitioners sought to appeal from an adverse judgment at trial. The
cifically noted that both the Judicial Council of California and the legislature have the
power to make rules governing in forma pauperis relief. However, until those bodies
have spoken on the subject, the California courts would continue to exercise their inherent powers to allow indigent litigants a reasonable opportunity to obtain appellate relief. Id.
38. Id. at 657, 484 P.2d at 75, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
39. Id. at 658, 484 P.2d at 76, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 404. See text accompanying
notes 73-74 inIra.
40. How effectively will the courts be able to administer their inherent powers
and such necessary counterparts as these safeguards? The court only briefly considered the possibility that the safeguards established to prevent sham or frivolous
appeals may prove too strong, having the effect of limiting otherwise meritorious
litigation. Id.
41. Compare Taylor v. Bouchier, 21 Eng. Rep. 365 (Ch. 1774) and Anonymous,
86 Eng. Rep. 873 (C.P. 1677) with Bland v. Lamb, 37 Eng. Rep. 680 (Ch. 1820) and
Fitton v. Macclesfield, 23 Eng. Rep. 459 (Ch. 1684).
42. 1 E. DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY
45 (2d Am. ed. J. Perkins 1846); 9 HALSBtRY, LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 863, 888, 911
(3d ed. 1954).
43. 104 Cal. App. 683, 286 P. 732 (1930).
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petitioners requested that the trial transcripts prepared by the court
clerk and court reporter be furnished without cost for the appeal.
There was a statute in effect," however, which provided that
no court official need work in a civil case until his fees had been advanced. The petitioners, however, moved to have these fees waived
because of their indigent status.45 The court refused to waive the transcript fees, but carefully pointed out that the indigents had not been
without an alternative remedy-they could have possibly filed a bill of
exceptions without incurring the expense of the transcripts."' The
court in Rucker did not find the waiver of statutory fees in Martin controlling because in the latter case the court had allowed the waiver of
statutory fees only at the trial level:
The ruling [in Martin] was based upon the rights of the courts of
common law to admit to sue in forma pauperis, such poor persons
as had not ability to pay the expenses incidental to the prosecution
of actions to enforce their rights. It is not shown that this right
extended to appeals or writs of error. The right of appeal is a
creature of written law,47and finds its authority in the Constitution
and statutes of the state.
Moreover, the Rucker court insisted, the transcript fee requested
by the petitioners would exceed $100, and for the court to waive this
fee would render the code section meaningless since there would be no
effective limitation to the amount of such fees which could be waived by
a court. The court found such a result unacceptable and refused to
extend in forma pauperis relief to the petitioners. The court also expressed the view that indigent relief procedures must be carefully applied by the courts and not used indiscriminately:
The right to sue or defend in forma pauperis is of such nature
that unless it is carefully guarded it is most susceptible of abuse.
44. Cal. Stat. 1903, ch. 200, § 3, at 234, now, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 69953
(West 1964).
45. 104 Cal. App. at 684-85, 286 P. at 732. The Ruckers supplied affidavits as
to their indigency.
46. Id. at 686, 286 P. at 733.
47. Id. at 685, 286 P. at 732. A discussion of the issue raised by Rucker led
one writer to conclude: "[T]he denial of the right to appeal in forma pauperis is
predicated upon the reasoning that all appeals are statutory and, since the right to
appeal was not adopted with the common law, the right to appeal in forma pauperis
could not have been derived from that source." Comment, 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 295
(1931).
See also Bradford v. Southern Ry., 195 U.S. 243 (1904), where the United
States Supreme Court found that "the right to prosecute a writ of error or an appeal
...depends on a statute, and not on the common law." Id. at 250. This conclusion led to the creation six years later of a statutory system for federal appeals in
forma pauperis. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252, was amended to provide
for appeals in forma pauperis by Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435, 36 Stat. 866, as
amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
See Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co.,
236 U.S. 43, 45 (1915) (analysis of the effect of the 1910 amendment).
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Therefore if allowed at all it should be regulated with the utmost
care.4
The Rucker opinion, though it was quite brief and did not discuss English precedent, apparently possessed considerable impact in
California. Indeed, the right to appeal in forma pauperis was not recognized until Ferguson, some 41 years later. Nevertheless, the court
in Ferguson dismissed the Rucker holding in rather summary fashion:
Although the Rucker case. . . without citation of authority, questioned whether at common law the right to sue in forma pauperis
extended to appeals or writs of error, several English cases prior
to 1850 . . . had expressly recognized such a right. .

.

.

[I]n

the absence of any definitive authority to the contrary, we conclude that the common law courts possessed and 49
exercised the
power to permit indigents to appeal in forma pauperis.
The summary treatment given the Rucker issue5--as to whether
the common law courts allowed appeals in forma pauperis-implies the
assumption by the court that since the power existed then, it exists now.
This assumption by the court pervades much of the Ferguson decision
and appears to lack a basis in documented authority. If the court's reasoning is to be extended beyond the factual confines of Ferguson itself, the decision warrants closer scrutiny. The use of the inherent
common law power by the Ferguson court to waive appellate fees might
be taken to mean that in any situation where the statutory modes of effecting relief are insufficient5 1 the court may select the appropriate common law tool to achieve a just result. Even though this use of inherent
power may produce a just result in a particular case, there appears to be
no legal foundation for a California court, operating at the appellate
level, to enhance its own authority by resort to such an inherent power.
On the other hand, there would appear to be no sound basis for contending that the statutory system of appellate procedures was established solely to define and limit the scope of power of the appellate
48. 104 Cal. App. at 685, 286 P. at 732.
49. Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 654, 484 P.2d 70, 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398,
401 (1971). The existence of this power at English common law was supported by
Drennan v. Andrew, L.R. 1 Ch. App. 300, 301 n.7 (1866) and cases cited therein.
50. 4 Cal. 3d at 654, 484 P.2d at 72-73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01. The court in
Ferguson noted that it was dealing with a different statute and different policy considerations than those considered by the Rucker court. Id. The waiver of the statute in
Rucker would impose on third parties the additional expense of preparing clerk's and
reporter's trial transcripts for use on appeal. Such an expense, varying with the size
of the transcript, differs from fixed court operating costs or filing fees involved in
Ferguson.

51. If the Ferguson court had not provided a common law appeal in forma panperis, such an injustice might well have resulted. If the indigents were unable to pay
the required fee, there would have been no statutory basis for providing them with
appellate relief. Id. at 653, 484 P.2d at 72, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
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courts. The following discussion will examine the right of civil appeal
both under California law and the common law.
Appeal Under CaliforniaLaw and the Common Law
The California Constitution establishes appellate tribunals capable of hearing civil cases;5 2 the California codes regulate their operation.5 3 The early California case of People v. Reid 4 discussed the
similarities between the modem statutory appellate remedy and the old
common law writ of error 5 and reasoned that when the modern remedy overlaps with the old and there is a conflict, the modem remedy
should be controlling:
Where the legislature has provided a statutory remedy which supplants in whole or in part a corresponding common-law remedy
. . . there is presented the situation of a conflict between the
common law and the statute, in which case the latter must prevail.5 1
Although there were appellate procedures at common law somewhat analogous to modern appeals,57 some of the common law procedures-such as the in forma pauperis appeal-have no counterpart in
California's statutory system.5 8 Thus, under the reasoning of Reid since
52. CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 1.
53. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 901-23 (West Supp. 1971).
54. 195 Cal. 249, 254-56, 232 P. 457, 459-60 (1924).
55. A writ of error is used by an appellate court to review alleged errors in law
committed by a court of record. The judgment of the lower court "may be reversed, corrected, or affirmed, as the case may require." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1785 (4th ed. 1951). For a description of this writ in its proper historical perspective see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 201-02, 213-16 (7th ed.
1956); 3 J. REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 57 (3d ed. 1814).
56. People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 257, 232 P. 457, 461 (1924).
57. The case of Duvergier v. Fellowes, 6 Eng. Rep. 831 (H.L. 1832) provides
an example of the process involved in the common law writ of error, which is more
clearly analogous to modern appellate review. Plaintiff initiated an action of debt on
a bond in the court of common pleas. Duvergier v. Fellows, 130 Eng. Rep. 1056
(C.P. 1828). Because of the illegality of one of the conditions of the bond, judgment
was rendered for the defendant. Plaintiff then brought a writ of error to the court
of Kings Bench. Duvergier v. Fellows, 109 Eng. Rep. 655 (K.B. 1830). The appellate court reviewed the lower court's determination that the condition of the bond was
illegal and affirmed the judgment for the defendant. Plaintiff again brought a writ
of error, this time to the House of Lords. Duvergier v. Fellows, 6 Eng. Rep. 831
(H.L. 1832). Again the determination as to the illegality of the condition was reviewed and the judgments of the courts below were affirmed. The process followed
here seems quite similar to California's statutory appeal.
The appellate process in Chancery is illustrated in Drennan v. Andrew, L.R.
1 Ch. App. 300 (1866). Drennan involves a petition for a rehearing before the Lord
Chancellor of a case previously decided by the Vice Chancellor.
58. Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal. 3d 649, 653, 484 P.2d 70, 72, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398,
400 (1971).
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there is no statutory counterpart to such appellate procedures, there is
no conflict and the common law remedy would not be superseded. However, a more important question is whether the common law in forma
pauperis appellate procedures have been totally superseded because they
are part of a larger unit-the common law appellate system-which has
been replaced by California statutes as a unit. The underlying premise
of the Rucker court was that the California statutory appellate system is
a unit, complete in itself, which has superseded any common law appellate procedures. 5 9 The court, however, cited no authority for this
conceptualization of California's appellate structure. The court in Ferguson obviously disagreed with the premise of the Rucker court and
60
adopted the common law in forma pauperis appellate procedure.
The court in Ferguson, however, supplied no guidelines for the scope of
its adoption of the common law appellate procedures.
The Ferguson court may have adopted the position that all common law appellate remedies not directly superseded by statute have been
adopted as the law of California. On the other hand, the court may
have taken the position that the in forma pauperis procedures, due to
the special nature of the relief accorded, are excepted from the overall common law appellate system which has otherwise been totally superseded by statute. Only the first of these two alternative positions
would allow the courts to utilize common law procedures to fill any
further gaps in California's appellate system.
The court in Ferguson recognized one of these gaps 6 1 -the provision of free transcripts for indigents on appeal-but did not specifically state that courts could utilize the inherent common law power to
provide indigents with free transcripts on appeal. Such a result could
certainly be implied, however, and whether the court intended the waiver
of statutory appellate filing fees as a specific exception or as a judicial
-precedent that could allow courts the inherent power to provide free
transcripts will have to be determined in subsequent cases. Ferguson would have been a more workable precedent if the court had clearly
established the extent to which common law appellate procedures have
been superseded by statute.
One of the major arguments against any further expansion of the
court's inherent power to grant remedial relief is the recognition that the
legislature is best equipped to do research in this area and to ascertain
62
the potential social effects of appellate in forma pauperis procedures.
59.
60.
61.
62.
Council.

See Rucker v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. App. 683, 286 P. 732 (1930).
4 Cal. 3d at 654, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
Id. at 654, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
The legislature could accomplish this through its committees or the Judicial
See id. at 655, 484 P.2d at 73, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
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The federal courts had been faced with a similar situation insofar as
the rights of indigents to civil appellate procedures, and Congress enacted statutes allowing in forma pauperis appellate relief.13 Included
in the federal appellate system are express provisions for the waiver
of fees64 and for the provision of free transcripts. 65 A similar statutory system for in forma pauperis appeals in California could resolve
the uncertainties and difficulties that may develop if the courts are required to rely on the exercise of inherent power to provide indigents
with appellate relief. The statutory approach would appear to be a preferable means of clarifying and solidifying a satisfactory in forma pauperis appellate system in California.
PreventingSham or Frivolous Appeals

Permitting indigents to litigate without paying court-related expenses is viewed as potentially troublesome because of a possible increase in the number of sham or frivolous appeals.6 6 The reasoning
advanced in support of this view is that if an individual is required to
pay a statutory filing fee to commence a lawsuit, he will be less likely to
use the courts for the purposes of harassing another party or pursuing
meritless actions. To guard against such adverse results, courts and
legislatures, when sanctioning proceedings in forma pauperis, have
been compelled to substitute various other deterrents for the waived
expenses. The old English common law courts reportedly used whipping of the unsuccessful pauper litigant as a deterrent. 67 California
has developed a system of deterrents somewhat more enlightened than
whipping, and perhaps more effective also.68 The obvious danger of
such deterrents is that the method selected to prevent frivolous litigation may prove too strong and may make the courts inaccessible to the
poor as effectively as though there were no in forma pauperis proceedings available.6 9
The court in Ferguson contemplated briefly the possibility that an
indigent's access to the appellate courts might be barred by an overly
strict application of such deterrents:
It should go without saying that these sanctions must be evenly
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
64.

Id. § 1915(a).

65.
66.

Id. § 1915(b).
See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
Drennan v. Andrew, L.R. 1 Ch. App. 300, 301 n.7 (1866).

67.
68.
69.
(1969).

See text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
See O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 601-02, 458 P.2d 154, 160-61
See also Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for
PoorPersons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 21, 26-27 (1967).
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applied and equally imposed upon indigent and nonindigent alike
"70

Thus California's courts have been directed by the supreme court to
avoid using these requirements 7l to impose any extra penalty or burden on indigents. Rather than providing for any new penalties, the
court in Ferguson enumerated several extra safeguards to take the place
of a filing fee. Regarding appellate proceedings in particular, the court
established the following minimum guidelines: (1) the applicant must
submit his counsel's certificate stating that the case has merit and is
brought in good faith, and (2) the applicant must declare that he is too
poor to pay the fees and must provide appropriate facts to support-his
declaration. 72 The Ferguson court also noted that the appellate courts
reserve the power to dismiss summarily any proceeding found to be
sham or frivolous.7a
The standards for allowing indigents appellate relief appear to be
an attempt by the court to accomplish as fairly as possible the social
objective of providing in forma pauperis procedures. Rather than imposing greater penalties on indigents, these standards merely establish
a procedure which allows an earlier determination of whether an action
has merit. However, the application of the standards leave much to the
discretion of individual courts. If guidelines were expressly provided
by the California legislature for all in forma pauperis civil appealssimilar to those applicable to federal appeals7 4-- the beneficial result
would be unambiguous requirements which could be relied upon by
indigents and court alike.
Conclusion
In Ferguson v. Keays the California Supreme Court recognized the
inherent power of the state courts, in the absence of statutory authority,
to permit in forma pauperis civil appeals. This power inherited from
the pre-1850 English common law was deemed sufficient authority for
an appellate court to waive general statutory fees for an indigent party
on the basis that the legislation did not expressly include indigents
within its coverage. Unfortunately, the court in Ferguson failed to
consider the degree to which further common law appellate procedures
may be incorporated into the California appellate system as presently
understood and utilized. A clear and specific enunciation of the nature, scope, and extent of these inherent powers of California's appel70. 4 Cal. 3d at 658-59, 484 P.2d at 76, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 658, 484 P.2d at 75, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
73. Id.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
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late courts would certainly have been more enlightening. The California Supreme Court, by using this inherent power to ensure adequate
relief for indigents, did not find it necesary to consider constitutional
75
questions.
Although the United States Supreme Court has provided extensive
relief for the criminal pauper,7 6 it has been reluctant, to afford the
same type of relief to the civil pauper.7 7 A statutory approach to in
forma pauperis proceedings in California would be preferable and could
provide as much relief for indigents as social policies would make desirable-subject, of course, to constitutional minimums. In addition to
relieving the courts of the necessity of justifying an ill-defined inherent
power, the enactment of appropriate statutes could provide the California courts with legislative assistance in effectively preventing sham
or frivolous litigation.
In summary, a statutory system for appeals in forma pauperis
seems likely to be the most efficient and effective means of guaranteeing
equal justice to the poor.78 Though the court in Ferguson reached a
desirable result through the use of its inherent power to waive statutory
appellate filing fees, the California legislature should not await a case
by case determination by the courts to fully define these crucial rights
for civil litigants.
William F. Johns*
75.
76.
351 U.S.
77.
78.

*

4 Cal. 3d at 656 n.6, 484 P.2d at 74 n.6, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 402 n.6.
See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois,
12 (1956).
See discussion in note 4 supra.
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970).
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